Abstract. This paper describes new attacks on pkcs#1 v1.5, a deprecated but still widely used rsa encryption standard.
and regularly updated since. Today, pkcs has become part of several standards and of a wide range of security products including Internet Privacy-Enhanced Mail.
Amongst the pkcs collection, pkcs#1 v1.5 describes a particular encoding method for rsa encryption called rsaEncryption. In essence, the protected data is first encrypted under a randomly chosen key κ using a symmetric block-cipher (e.g. a triple des in cbc mode) then κ is rsaencrypted (wrapped) with the recipient's public key.
In 1998, Bleichenbacher [4] published an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack against pkcs#1 v1.5 capable of recovering arbitrary plaintexts from about half a million ciphertexts. Although active adversary models are generally regarded as theoretical concerns, Bleichenbacher's attack makes use of an oracle that only detects conformance with respect to the padding format, a real-life assumption that resulted in a practical threat. pkcs#1 v1.5 was subsequently updated (release 2.0 [15] ) and patches were issued to users wishing to continue using the old version of the standard. As we write these lines 3 and despite its vulnerabilities, pkcs#1 v1.5 is still widely used. Millions of (patched) pkcs#1 v1.5 programs remain deployed. Provably secure algorithms such as rsa-oaep [10] and rsakem are recommended replacements, but not widespread yet [16] .
Independently, there exist several well-known chosen-plaintext attacks on rsa-based encryption schemes [7, 5] . These typically enable an attacker to decrypt ciphertexts at moderate cost without factoring the public modulus. The most powerful cryptanalytic tool applicable to low exponent rsa is certainly an attack due to Coppersmith [6] . As a matter of fact, one major reason for adding randomness to encrypted messages 4 is to thwart such attacks.
The last publication concerning pkcs#1 v1.5's security [8] presented a somewhat atypical attack allowing the opponent to retrieve plaintexts ending by enough zero bits. This paper describes two new weaknesses in pkcs#1 v1.5:
-The possibility to predict, using a single decryption query, which of two chosen plaintexts corresponds to a challenge ciphertext. The attack's success odds are very high.
-A broadcast attack allowing to decrypt an identical message sent to several recipients.
From a mathematical perspective, the two techniques are totally different. The authors regard these as a wake-up call to accelerate the phase out of pkcs#1 v1.5.
pkcs#1 v1.5 Encryption
We assume that the reader is familiar with the traditional public-key encryption definitions and security model preliminaries. For the sake of completeness we refer the reader to Appendix A.
The pkcs#1 v1.5 Encoding Function
pkcs#1 v1.5 describes a particular encoding method (rsaEncryption) for rsa encryption [19] . Consider an rsa modulus N , and let k denote its byte-length (i.e. 2 8(k−1) < N < 2 8k ). Let m be an |m|-byte message with |m| < k − 11. The pkcs#1 v1.5 padding µ(m) of m is defined as follows:
1. A randomizer r consisting in k−3−|m| ≥ 8 nonzero bytes is generated uniformly at random; 2. µ(m) = µ(m, r) is the integer converted from the octet-string:
(the leading 00 octet guarantees that the encryption block is an integer smaller than N ).
The encryption of a message m of |m| < k − 11 bytes is defined as c = µ(m, r) e mod N for some randomizer r of k − 3 − |m| nonzero bytes.
To decrypt c ∈ Z * N , compute c d mod N , convert the result to a k-byte octet-string and parse it according to equation (1) . If the string cannot be parsed unambiguously or if r is shorter than eight octets, the decryption algorithm D outputs ⊥; otherwise, D outputs the plaintext m.
Previous attacks on pkcs#1 v1.5
In 1998, Bleichenbacher [4] published an attack on pkcs#1 v1.5 capable of recovering arbitrary plaintexts from a large number of ciphertexts validation queries. This attack established that pkcs#1 v1.5 is not ℓ-GOAL-ATTACK for a large 5 ℓ, GOAL ∈ {OW, IND, NM} and ATTACK ∈ {VCA, CCA} (see Appendix A.3 for definitions of these security notions).
In 2000, Coron, Naccache, Joye and Paillier [8] introduced two new CPAs on pkcs#1 v1.5. The first attack can be considered as a IND-CPA when e is small (for plaintext ending by sufficiently many zeroes). The second attack applies to arbitrary e, provided that |m| is large and most message bits are zeroes. Thus pkcs#1 v1.5 is not GOAL-CPA for a small e or a large |m|, for GOAL ∈ {IND, NM}.
The previous crytanalytic results are summarized in Figure 1 . UBK-CPA is equivalent to Factoring but establishing the UBK-VCA and UBK-CCA security is equivalent to proving (or refuting) the equivalence of the factoring and the RSA Problem (which is a long-standing open question in cryptography). In the rest of the paper, we will study the remaining security notions and prove that pkcs#1 v1.5 is:
-OW-CPA assuming the intractability of the RSA problem ( § 3);
-not OW-CPA in a multi-user setting ( § 5).
3 On pkcs#1 v1.5's OW-CPA-Security
In this paragraph, we prove the following result: 5 3 · 10 5 < ℓ < 2 · 10 6 for 512 < log 2 N < 1024 Proposition 1. The OW-CPA security of pkcs#1 v1.5 is equivalent to the RSA Problem.
In [9, Lemma 2], Coron, Joye, Naccache and Paillier proved that for suitable parameters, the existence of an algorithm that on input y ∈ Z * N outputs the k 1 least significant bits of y d mod N is equivalent to the existence of an rsa inverter. Following their approach, we prove the following lemma: Lemma 1. Let A be a OW-CPA-adversary against pkcs#1 v1.5 with success probability ε within time τ , with uniformly distributed messages of (maximum) length k − 11. There exists an algorithm B that solves the RSA Problem with success probability ε ′ within time τ ′ , where:
where η is a constant independent of k and η ≥ 5 · 10 −8 .
Proof. Let A be a OW-CPA-adversary against pkcs#1 v1.5 with success probability ε within time τ . We construct an algorithm B that on input y ∈ Z * N outputs y d with success probability ε ′ within time τ ′ : 1. B picks α ∈ Z * N uniformly at random; 2. B sets y 0 = y and y 1 = y · α e 3. Let us denote, for i ∈ {0, 1}:
with β = 8(k − 11). y i is a valid pkcs#1 v1.5 ciphertext if ω i = 0002||r i ||00 where r i is a 8-(nonzero)-octet string. This happens with probability η ≥ (255/256) 8 · 2 −24 . If this happens, then with probability ε, A will return m i on input y i (for i ∈ {0, 1}). 4. Therefore with probability at least (ηε) 2 , we obtain:
Letting c 1 = 2 −β (αm 0 − m 1 ) mod N , we get the equation in (ω 0 , ω 1 ):
From [9, Lemma 3] , there exists an algorithm that given this system will output a solution (ω 0 , ω 1 ) (should such a solution exist) with probability at least 1 − 2 −k on the choice of α.
⊓ ⊔
Using the same technique, this can be extended to messages of different length, with a possibly higher constant loss in the reduction.
As a byproduct of the previous proof one immediately gets that:
Proof. Thanks to rsa's homomorphic properties, an adversary can mask the challenge ciphertext c as c ′ = cr e for some random r and with two decryption oracle queries, compute the e-th root x ′ of c ′ as in the previous proof. Then x = x ′ /r is the e-th root of c from which, the adversary retrieves readily the plaintext.
⊓ ⊔ 4 pkcs#1 v1.5 Malleability and Indistinguishability
We now show that µ is neither NM-CPA-secure nor IND-VCA-secure. The general idea is the following. Let m be some message to be encrypted, and µ(m) a corresponding pkcs#1 v1.5 padded encryption block. If m has Z > 2 trailing zero bits, then µ(m) is divisible by 2 Z , and µ(m) − µ(m)/2 Z mod N has a good probability of still being a valid encryption block. This is not usually the case when the Z lsbs of m are not all zero.
Let c = µ(m) e mod N be a ciphertext of some message m. If m has Z > 2 trailing zeroes, c ′ = c · (1 − 2 −Z ) e mod N will often be a valid ciphertext of some other message m ′ which can be related to m: this contradicts non-malleability under chosen plaintext attack. Moreover, if one is granted one query to a validity oracle, it is possible to distinguish ciphertexts of plaintexts with trailing zeroes and ciphertexts from plaintexts whose lsbs are not all zero: this contradicts indistinguishability under validity checking attack. Note that if i queries are allowed, the distinguishing success odds can quickly approach one by iterating the test with c ′ i = c · (i − 2 −Z ) e mod N for i = 1, 2, . . . We will develop this idea in further detail in the coming sections.
On pkcs#1 v1.5's NM-CPA Security
Let k be the byte-size of N , Z = 4k, and M a positive integer such that M + Z + 1 is a multiple of 8 and (M + Z + 1)/8 < k − 11. We consider messages of the following form:
Let M denote the uniform distribution over messages of this form. Furthermore, we define a relation R over messages of length l = M + Z + 1 as follows: for any l-bit two messages m 1 , m 2 (not necessarily of the previous form), R(m 1 , m 2 ) holds if and only if the M msbs of m 1 and m 2 coincide. In particular, for any given message m 2 , there is exactly one m 1 ∈ M such that R(m 1 , m 2 ). Now, consider m ← M. We can write µ(m) · (1 − 2 −Z ) as:
Consider, the NM-CPA adversary A which outputs sampling algorithm M in the setup stage, and transforms a challenge ciphertext c into c
which is non-negligible. Therefore, pkcs#1 v1.5 encryption is not NM-CPA-secure. Noted that A's advantage is, in fact ∼ 1. For a 1024-bit modulus and a 128 bit randomizer, we have M = 383, making it exceedingly unlikely that A will ever fail.
On pkcs#1 v1.5's IND-VCA Security
We now show how to contradict ciphertext indistinguishability under validity checking attack using a single oracle query. There are two natural types of validity oracles: one which determines whether a given query is a valid ciphertext associated to a plaintext of any length, and the other which also checks message length. We can always contradict IND-VCAsecurity in the non-length-checking case (which is the one considered in Bleichenbacher's attack [4] ) with a single oracle query. Furthermore, if the byte-length of the randomizer is constant, as permitted by the pkcs#1 v1.5 standard, it is also possible to break IND-VCA-security with a single query to a length-checking oracle. Both attacks stem from the following result. If, for an integer x, we denote byx the only integer in (−N/2, N/2) such that x ≡x mod N , it follows that:
Consider the set S of residue classes x mod N such that |x| < 2 8k−16 . Clearly, |S| = 2 8k−15 − 1. On the other hand, let T + be the set consisting of k-byte strings of the form 000 16 u 0 16 , and T be the union of T + and −T + (where opposites are taken mod N ). We also have |T | = 2 8k−15 − 1 and T maps into S under multiplication by 2 −4 mod N . Since multiplication by 2 −4 is a permutation of Z N , we infer that (y · 2 −4 mod N ) ∈ S if and only if y ∈ T .
In particular, if c ′ is a valid ciphertext, we get µ(m) ∈ T . By inspection of its top bits, we see that µ(m) cannot be in −T + , so it has to be in T + . Its least-significant nibble must thus be 0 16 as required.
Turning now to the second assertion, let m be the zero-message of some fixed byte-length. Write the encryption block µ(m) as follows: µ(m) = 0002 16 r 2ω−1 r 2ω−2 · · · r 1 r 0 00 16 00 · · · 00 16 where r 0 , . . . , r 2ω−1 are randomizer's nibbles. Recall that the randomizer bytes r 2j r 2j+1 are chosen uniformly and independently at random in the range 01 16 , . . . , FF 16 .
Assuming that r 2ω−1 is at least 4 (which happens with probability (256 − 4 × 16)/255 = 64/85, and which we will henceforth assume), we can write (1 − 2 −4 )µ(m) as: 0002 16 r 2ω−1 r 2ω−2 · · · r 1 r 0 00 16 00 · · · 00 16 − 0000 16 2 16 r 2ω−1 · · · r 2 r 1 r 0 0 16 00 · · · 00 16
where r ′ j ≡ r j − r j+1 − κ j mod 16 for some carry bit κ j . Then, µ ′ = (1 − 2 −4 )µ(m) is a valid encoding block if and only if the first 8 randomizer bytes, namely r ′ 2ω+1−2j r ′ 2ω−2j , j = 1, . . . , 8, are all nonzero. µ ′ is a valid encoding block for a message of the same length as m (or for short, "strongly valid") if and only if s = 0 and all the padding bytes r ′ 2j+1 r ′ 2j , j = 0, . . . , ω − 1, are nonzero. We will find an explicit lower bound for the probability of these events.
Note first that a sufficient condition for r ′ 2j+1 r ′ 2j to be nonzero is that r ′ 2j+1 = 0. This nibble is zero if and only if r 2j+2 ≡ r 2j+1 − κ 2j+1 . Now r 2j+2 is picked independently of r 2j+1 , since they belong to different bytes; it is also independent of κ 2j+1 , which only depends on lower order bytes. Consequently:
16 255 and this bound still holds conditionally to any assignment of the lower order nibbles r ′ 2i+1 , i < j. Therefore:
Furthermore:
The corresponding validity assertions for c ′ follow immediately. which is non-negligible. In the length-checking case, it is over 2.8% (resp. 1.6%) for 64-bit (resp. 128-bit) randomizers.
In the non-length-checking case, we can obtain an even better advantage using c ′ = c · (1 −
We now examine the security of pkcs#1 v1.5 in a multiple users context. In such a scenario, i.e. when broadcast encryption is performed, the sender wishes to transmit the same message m to ℓ parties P 1 , . . . , P ℓ . As each party has its own key pk i = (e, N i ) (with a common public exponent e), the sender encrypts m using all the pk i 's and sends the resulting ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c ℓ to the corresponding recipients. It has long been known that textbook rsa encryption should not be used in such a context, since an attacker can easily recover the plaintext using the Chinese Remainder Theorem as long as ℓ ≥ e. Therefore, m has to be padded before applying the rsa function, and the padding has to be different for each recipient.
In 1988, Håstad [11] showed that using different linear paddings µ i (m) for all parties is not enough to guarantee security. Indeed, when e is small, e ciphertexts are again sufficient to efficiently recover m provided that the encoding functions µ i are known to the attacker. To achieve this result, Håstad expressed the attack in terms of finding small roots of a univariate modular polynomial, which he accomplishes using Coppersmith's techniques [6] .
Håstad's attack does not apply to pkcs#1 v1.5, since the padding used for a given recipient is random, and is thus unknown to an attacker. The following sections will overcome this difficulty. Our main result is as follows: 
Its complexity is polynomial in e, |m| and k but exponential in the number of ciphertexts ℓ.
We describe this algorithm in the coming sections. The core idea is to reduce the problem to finding small modular roots of a multivariate polynomial equation, which can be achieved using a standard generalization of Coppersmith's techniques. As usual, this generalization relies on an assumption concerning independence between polynomials, which makes the algorithm heuristic.
The Multivariate Polynomial of Broadcast pkcs#1 v1.5
Recall (section 2.1) that to encrypt message m for recipient P i , a pkcs#1 v1.5 sender first generates an |r i |-byte randomizer r i , and then computes the encoding function: µ(m, r i ) = 0002 16 r i 00 16 m Numerically, this gives:
The ciphertext c i is then computed as c i = µ(m, r i ) e mod N i . Consider then an adversary A who obtains c 1 , . . . , c ℓ . Since the N i are of the same size, the randomizers r i have a common byte length |r|. Therefore, the ciphertexts collected by A can be written as:
e mod N 1 , . . . , c ℓ = (m + Ar ℓ + B) e mod N ℓ where A = 2 8|m|+8 and B = 2 8|m|+8|r|+9 . Obviously, the N i are pairwise co-prime (otherwise, the factorization of some of the N i could easily be recovered). Thus, the Chinese Remainder Theorem ensures that the previous equations can be rewritten as a single congruence mod N = N 1 · · · N ℓ :
where the constants u 1 , . . . , u ℓ are given by the extended Euclidean algorithm. It follows that the tuple (m, r 1 , . . . , r ℓ ) is a root of the multivariate modular polynomial:
where C = u 1 c 1 + · · · + u ℓ c ℓ . This root is small in the sense that all of its components are bounded by quantities that are small compared to N : m is smaller than 2 8|m| and each r i is bounded by 2 8|r| . Under suitable conditions on |m| and |r| which will be detailed below, it will thus become feasible to recover this root, and hence m, in polynomial time using Coppersmith's techniques, as recalled in Appendix B.
In particular, we show in section B.3 that the lattice construction of Jochemsz and May [13] yields a heuristic polynomial time algorithm for recovering the small root of f under the following condition:
where ν is a parameter which determines the attack's complexity, and s(ν), t(ν) are defined as:
We also prove in the same section that t(ν)/s(ν) → 1/e as ν tends to +∞, so that the best achievable bound on |m| and |r| for which the attack applies is: ℓ|r| + |m| < ℓk e Since |r| = k − |m| − 3 in pkcs#1 v1.5 we obtain the bound announced in Proposition 4. As usual when using Coppersmith's techniques, the complexity of the attack is polynomial in the dimension of the constructed lattice and in the size of the entries (see Appendix B for details on these parameters).
Given pkcs#1 v1.5's widespread use and the heuristic nature of multivariate Coppersmith-like techniques, it is important to practically assess our attack. We report practical experiment results in Appendix C.
Conclusion
Figure 2 summarizes our current knowledge of pkcs#1 v1.5 security.
The authors regard the new flaws as an indication that the process of phasing out pkcs#1 v1.5 should be accelerated. 
A Preliminaries
In this appendix we recall a few basic definitions necessary for an accurate description of our attack:
A.1 Public-Key Encryption
A Public-Key Encryption Scheme P = (K, E, D) is a collection of three (probabilistic) algorithms:
A Key Generation Algorithm K: Given a security parameter k ∈ N, the algorithm K produces a pair (pk, sk) of matching public and private keys (which implicitly define a message space M).
An Encryption Algorithm E: Given a message m ∈ M and a public key pk, E produces a ciphertext c = E(pk, m). For all m ∈ M and for properly generated {pk, sk}, the following correctness condition holds:
We will denote by A adversaries, defined in the next section.
A.2 rsa Encryption
In [19] , the algorithm K produces a pair (pk = (N, e), sk = d) where N = pq is the product of two large primes and e and d are such that ed = 1 mod ϕ(N ). The encryption of a message m ∈ M = Z * N , is simply c = m e mod N . c can be easily decrypted using d: m = c d mod N .
A.3 Security Definitions
Security is traditionally defined by combining an adversarial goal and an attack model. We refer to classical texts on provable security, such as [18] , for precise statements of security definitions. Intuitively, a public-key encryption scheme P is:
Unbreakable (UBK) If no adversary A can compute sk given pk.
One-Way (OW) If no adversary A can recover m ∈ M given c and pk.
Indistinguishable (IND)
If no adversary A can derive significant information about m ∈ M given only c and pk. IND is sometimes alternatively referred to as "semantically secure".
Non-Malleable (NM)
If no adversary A can, produce, given c and pk, a new ciphertext corresponding to a plaintext m ′ meaningfully related to m.
In the above, "no adversary" should be read as "an efficient adversary succeeding with a significant probability". The terms "efficiently", "significant probability", "significant information" and "meaningfully related" admit formal definitions which are beyond our scope.
Security notions for encryption schemes are obtained by combining an adversarial goal with an attack model:
Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA) A is given nothing more than pk.
Validating-Checking Attack (VCA) A is given access to a validitychecking oracle indicating only if a given ciphertext is a valid or not (i.e. returning the bit D(sk, c) ? =⊥). Note that this is not the same thing as a Plaintext-Checking Attack (PCA) [18] .
Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (CCA) A has access to a decryption oracle.
Whenever oracle access is used A cannot submit to the oracle the challenge ciphertext he has to attack. These definitions are classical and we refer the reader to [18] for more details.
We denote security notions positively: e.g. OW-VCA[S] is the problem of contradicting the one-wayness of scheme S under validity-checking attack. This convention permits the easy description of hierarchies between security notions using reductions (see Figure 3) . When oracle access is permitted (i.e. either for VCA or CCA), we denote by ℓ-GOAL-ATTACK[S] the problem of contradicting GOAL ∈ {UBK, OW, IND, NM} in less than ℓ oracle queries under an ATTACK ∈ {VCA, CCA}. 
A.4 rsa Security
Single User rsa Security rsa encryption is UBK-CPA-secure assuming the hardness of factoring. Contradicting rsa's OW-CPA security is known as the RSA Problem and is believed to be intractable. rsa's determinism makes the validity-checking oracle useless and rsa is therefore OW-VCA-secure relative to the RSA problem as well. Unfortunately, because of this determinism, rsa cannot be semantically secure: given the encryption c of either m 0 or m 1 , the adversary simply computes c 0 = m e 0 mod N and checks whether c 0 = c. Many variants of this basic scheme have been proposed with the hope of making them semantically secure through the use of randomized padding schemes. This paper focuses on all the previously mentioned security notions for the padding pkcs#1 v1.5.
Multiple User rsa Security The previous definitions do not capture security in a multicast context. In the early 1990s, attacks against low-exponent rsa highlighted the danger of multi-user security threats left uncaptured by single-user models. In independent works, Baudron, Pointcheval and Stern [1] and Bellare, Boldyreva and Micali [2] proved that for strong security notions (namely IND or NM), schemes with reductionist security in the multi-user setting are exactly those permitting security proofs in the single-user setting. However, encryption one-wayness (OW) in a multi-user setting is not guaranteed only when the plaintexts are somehow correlated.
For rsa encryption, if a common e is used, then e encryptions of a given message under different public keys N 1 , . . . , N e lead to an easy plaintext recovery. Again, several countermeasures have been proposed (e.g. padding the message with random bits) but with an unclear security guarantees. The second part of this paper explores broadcast attacks on pkcs#1 v1.5.
B Finding Small Modular Roots of a Multivariate Polynomial
The problem of solving modular polynomial equations is believed to be difficult in the general case. Nevertheless, when we restrict the problem to finding small roots only, the problem becomes easier to solve. Indeed, in 1996, Coppersmith [5] introduced a technique, based on lattice reduction, allowing to recover the root of a univariate modular polynomial provided that this root is small enough. This construction was reformulated in simpler terms by Howgrave-Graham [12] and its extensions to more variables found numerous cryptanalytic applications.
B.1 Coppersmith's Technique.
Starting from a polynomial f modulo a known composite integer N , the idea behind Coppersmith's method is to construct a set of polynomials h 1 , . . . , h n sharing the same sought root over the integers. If the number of these generated polynomials is sufficiently large (greater than the number of variables) and under the assumption that all resultant computations lead to non-zero results, then the root can easily be recovered. Note that this assumption makes the method heuristic. A sufficient condition ensuring that the polynomials h 1 , . . . , h n share a common root in Z was formulated by Howgrave-Graham.
Lemma 2 (Howgrave-Graham [12] ). Let h ∈ Z[x 1 , . . . , x n ] be an integer polynomial that consists of at most ω monomials. Suppose that
Then h(x 01 , . . . , x 0n ) = 0 holds over the integers.
The problem can thus be reduced to finding polynomials h 1 , . . . , h n of small norm having the same modular root as f . This can be achieved by representing polynomials as coefficient vectors (using a suitable ordering on monomials) and using lattice reduction techniques such as lll [17] to search for small vectors in a lattice spanned by polynomials which are known to have the sought modular root.
If L is a lattice of polynomials consisting of at most ω monomials and all having the same modular root as f , then the condition 2 ω(ω−1)
ensures first n polynomials obtained by applying lll to the lattice L match Howgrave-Graham's bound. In the analysis, we let terms that do not depend on N contribute to an error term ε, and simply use the determinant condition det(L) ≤ N w+1−n .
B.2 Lattice Construction
A variety of methods for constructing the lattice L have been proposed in the literature. In what follows, we choose to rely on the technique introduced by Jochemsz and May in [13] .
Recall that we have a polynomial f with an unknown root x 0 = (x 01 , . . . , x 0n ) modulo some composite integer N whose factorization is unknown. This root is small in the sense that each of its components is bounded: |x 0i | < X i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We denote by λ the leading monomial of the polynomial f and by M(f ) the set of monomials appearing in f . Of course, λ can be assumed to be monic as otherwise one simply has to multiply f by the modular inverse of its initial coefficient.
Given ε > 0, we fix an integer ν = ν(ε) and without loss of generality we assume that M(f j ) ⊆ M(f ν ) for j ∈ {1, . . . , ν − 1}. If k is an integer between 0 and ν + 1, we define the set
. Next, we define the following shift polynomials:
for k ∈ {0, . . . , ν} and x
. By definition, all polynomials g have the root (x 01 , . . . , x 0n ) modulo N ν . We can now define L as the lattice generated by the coefficient vectors of all polynomials g i 1 ...in (x 1 X 1 , . . . , x n X n ). If the monomial ordering has been chosen correctly, the matrix corresponding to that lattice is lower triangular and the determinant becomes easy to compute. Indeed, the diagonal elements are those corresponding to the monomial λ k in f k for each row. Therefore, the diagonal terms of the matrix are X
By doing a simple computation and neglecting low order terms, one can finally reduce the condition (4) to the following new one:
This formula expresses an asymptotic condition on the bounds X 1 , . . . , X n allowing to recover the root in polynomial time.
Remark 1. The method outlined above is what Jochemsz and May called the "basic strategy"; they also proposed an "extended strategy" in which we can use extra shifts of a certain variable and replace M k for instance
B.3 The Jochemsz-May Lattice in Broadcast pkcs#1 v1.5
Let us examine what the lattice L looks like in the particular setting of broadcast pkcs#1 v1.5 encryption.
Recall from section 5.1 that recovering m from c 1 , . . . , c ℓ reduces to finding the root (x 0 , y 0,1 , . . . , y 0,ℓ ) = (m, r 1 , . . . , r ℓ ) of the following modular polynomial:
We know that this root satisfies the bounds |x 0 | < X and |y 0i | < Y for all i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} with X = 2 8|m| and Y = 2 8|r| . We examine how the Jochemsz-May bounds described in the previous section translate into bounds on |m| and |r| allowing the message to be recovered in polynomial time.
Form of the Sets M k . The analysis' first step consists in describing the sets M k . Note first that the set of monomials M(f ) is included in {x a y
In other words, the geometrical shape of the polynomial f is included in a "pyramid" of dimension ℓ+1 of monomials with total degree less than e. We choose the deglex monomial order, according to which the leading monomial of f is x e . The sets M k can then be described as follows: Condition on the Bounds. Given the above description, we can evaluate the quantities s j and s N of equation (5) 
(eν − ie + 1)(eν − ie + 2) · · · (eν − ie + ℓ + 1) (ℓ + 1)! Condition (5) can then be rewritten as X s(ν) Y ℓs(ν) < N t(ν) , and since N is of byte size ℓk, this gives:
Asymptotic Bound. The functions s(ν) and t(ν) are polynomials in ν. Hence, it suffices to evaluate their leading coefficients to obtain an asymptotic estimate as ν → +∞. Note further that s(ν) and t(ν) are easily expressed in terms of the antidifference operator, which takes a polynomial P (X) to the polynomial σ(P )(X) defined by σ(P )(j) = Now it is easily seen that if the leading coefficient of P is c d X d , the leading coefficient of σ(P ) is c d X d+1 /(d+1). It follows that, as ν → +∞, we have:
ℓ!(ℓ + 2) = (eν) ℓ+2 (ℓ + 2)! and t(ν) ∼ e ℓ+1 ν ℓ+2 (ℓ + 2)!
In particular, t(ν)/s(ν) → 1/e when ν → +∞. Thus, the best asymptotic bound on |m| and |r| for which the attack is theoretically possible is: ℓ|r| + |m| < ℓk e
C Broadcast Attack Experimental Results
Given pkcs#1 v1.5's widespread use and the heuristic nature of Coppersmith's techniques in the multivariate case, it is important to practically assess our attack. In particular, one of the main questions remains to know how many ciphertexts an attacker really needs in practice to recover m. In the particular instance {log 2 N = 1024, e = 3}, the number of required ciphertexts is, in fact, really low. Proof. This is a direct consequence of Proposition 4, given that, for 1024-bit moduli and 64-bit randomizers, message size is equal to 936 bits.
These parameters, corresponding to optimal message size and encryption speed for 1024-bit moduli, are quite realistic and widely implemented. The practical implications of this result are potentially serious.
